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THE ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS PRIVACY ACT: DOES THE
ACT LET THE GOVERNMENT SNOOP THROUGH YOUR EMAILS
AND WILL IT CONTINUE?
Brittany Brattain*
The Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) is an
enforcement powerhouse that has historically relied on the 1986
Electronic Communications Privacy Act (“ECPA”) to collect
electronic communications directly from Internet Service
Providers (“ISPs”) with a subpoena. The ECPA shields recent or
unopened electronic communications from government eyes, but
treats all others as abandoned and thus subject to warrantless
government search and seizure. In 2015, Congress introduced the
Email Privacy Act to align the ECPA with current technologies
and their pervasive role in society by requiring a warrant before
the government may access any emails from ISPs. The SEC seeks a
civil agency exemption. This Recent Development argues that the
SEC’s proposed exemption must fail because the bill’s warrant
requirement will respect the Fourth Amendment’s preference for
bright-line rules without inhibiting investigations.
I. INTRODUCTION
“As the target of an [sic] SEC investigation, I know that the
SEC has a broad array of tools at their disposal to obtain
information directly from targets,”1 said billionaire investor Mark
Cuban.2 The SEC was designed to “protect investors, maintain fair,
*

J.D. Candidate, University of North Carolina School of Law, 2017. The
author would like to thank the NC JOLT staff and editors for their thoughtful
feedback and encouragement, particularly Maria Moore, Charlotte Davis,
Chelsea Weiermiller, and Collette Corser.
1
Eric Hal Schwartz, The Big One: Mark Cuban Wants the SEC to Stay Out of
His Email, DCINNO, (Dec. 14, 2015, 12:00 PM), http://dcinno.streetwise.co/
2015/12/04/mark-cuban-wants-congress-ecpa-bill-to-stop-sec-email-searc/.
2
FORBES, The World’s Billionaires, http://www.forbes.com/profile/markcuban/ (last visited March 21, 2016).
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orderly, and efficient markets, and facilitate capital formation.”3
One branch of the SEC, the Division of Enforcement, is the
agency’s law enforcement arm which investigates and prosecutes
securities law violations.4 Historically, the SEC has relied on a
1986 law, the ECPA, to investigate alleged securities law
violations by compelling internet service providers (“ISPs”) to
disclose their subscribers’ private electronic communications.5
However, the SEC’s historic electronic investigative techniques are
now coming under scrutiny by Congress.6
The recent scrutiny arises as Congress asserts a bipartisan
effort to reform the ECPA to reflect new technologies.7 At the time
Congress created and passed the ECPA, the Internet was just
sixteen years old8 and the World Wide Web did not yet exist.9

3

U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, What We Do, https://www.sec.gov/News/
Article/Detail/Article/1356125787012 (last visited March 21, 2016).
4
U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N,
How
Investigations
Work,
https://www.sec.gov/News/Article/Detail/Article/1356125787012 (last visited
March 21, 2016). The Commission has the authority to bring proceedings in
federal court or initiate an administrative action, where appropriate. Id.
5
See United States v. Warshak, 532 F.3d 521, 523 (6th Cir. 2008); Warshak
v. United States, 631 F.3d 266, 288 (6th Cir. 2011).
6
See U.S. SENATE, Senate Committee on the Judiciary Questions for the
Record from Senator Grassley To: Andrew Ceresney Director, Division of
Enforcement U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n., https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/
download/ceresney-responses-to-questions-for-the-record [hereinafter Ceresney
Responses].
7
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, House Judiciary
Committee Announces Hearing on Electronic Communications Privacy Act,
(Nov.
24,
2015),
http://judiciary.house.gov/index.cfm/press-releases?
ID=7B80AA0E-CB80-4AD0-9FF7-467488B49B40
[hereinafter
Committee
Announces Hearing].
8
The Internet came to life in 1969, prompted by researchers and scientists
who desired to share information and computers remotely. By 1971, the Internet
grew into an electronic post office where individuals exchanged all types of
written information. Mark Ward, Celebrating 40 Years of the Net, BBC NEWS
(October 29, 2009, 9:25 PM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/
8331253.stm. For additional information on the formation of the Internet, see
RAND CORP., Paul Baran and the Origins of the Internet, http://www.rand.org/
about/history/baran.html (last visited March 21, 2016).
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Congress structured the ECPA based on specific assumptions
regarding how technologies worked in the 1980s and how
individuals interacted with such technologies during that time.10 As
technology has grown and changed over the years, the logic
underlying the ECPA is no longer fully accurate, and Congress
aims to correct these flaws by enacting the Email Privacy Act.11
The Email Privacy Act applies greater protections to a user’s
electronic communications by demanding that the government
obtain a warrant before it gains the power to compel a third-party
service provider to disclose a user’s private information.12 This
legislation significantly heightens the protections afforded to
electronic communications by requiring the government to obtain a
warrant based on probable cause and approved by a neutral
magistrate, as opposed to the current law, which allows the
government to compel information with merely a subpoena and
appropriate notice to the subject of the investigation.13 In reaction
to these magnified protections, the SEC claims that a warrant
requirement would impede its investigations.14 Accordingly, the
Commission is pushing for a civil agency exemption, which would
allow the SEC (and all civil agencies) to search and seize
electronic communications with only an administrative subpoena.15
9

The World Wide Web is made up of many linked documents. This part of
the Internet is viewable only with a special program, called a browser. STUDENT
DICTIONARY UPPER INTERMEDIATE LEVEL 980 (2d ed. 2016).
10
See H.R. REP. NO. 99-647, at 22-23 (1986).
11
See H.R. 699, 114th Cong. (2015), Currently filing through Committees in
the House is a bill called the Email Privacy Act, which is identical to a bill
moving through Committees in the Senate called the Electronic
Communications Privacy Amendment Act of 2015; see S. 356, 114th Cong.
(2015).
12
See H.R. 699.
13
See 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (2010), see also H.R. 699.
14
U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, Testimony on Updating the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act, (Dec. 1, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/news/
testimony/testimony-ceresney-12015.html.
15
“H.R. 699 would require government entities to procure a criminal warrant
when they seek the content of emails and other electronic communications from
ISPs. Because the SEC and other civil law enforcement agencies cannot obtain
criminal warrants, we would effectively not be able to gather evidence,
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This Recent Development argues that the SEC’s proposed civil
agency exemption to the Email Privacy Act should fail because it
would blur the line between criminal and civil law enforcement
investigation, deter the use of American technology, and ignore the
importance of electronic communication and storage in today’s
world. Part II provides background on the ECPA. Part III discusses
the Email Privacy Act and the Commission’s proposed civil
exemption to the bill. Part IV argues for the passage of the Email
Privacy Act without a civil agency exemption. Part V concludes.
II. THE ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS PRIVACY ACT AND ITS
HISTORY
In response to perceived gaps in federal privacy protection
afforded to electronic communications, Congress passed the
Electronic Communications Privacy Act (“ECPA”)16 in 1986 to
balance individual privacy and law enforcement needs.17 As a
result of rapid technological advances in computing and
telecommunication in the 1980s, individuals and corporations have
enjoyed unparalleled access to new technologies for processing
and storing data and communicating with others.18 With these
advances, “Americans . . . lost the ability to lock away a great deal
of personal and business information.”19 Technology outpaced
judicial interpretations20 of the Fourth Amendment and privacy
statutes in effect at the time.21 This section explores the
including communications such as emails, directly from an ISP, regardless of
the circumstances. Thus, if the bill becomes law without modifications, the SEC
and other civil law enforcement agencies would be denied the ability to obtain
critical evidence . . .” Id.
16
See S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 1, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3555
(“[This] bill . . . update[s] and clarif[ies] Federal privacy protections and
standards in light of dramatic changes in new computer and telecommunications
technologies.”).
17
See id. at 1 reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3555; see also Pub. L. No.
99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (1986).
18
See id. at 2-3, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3556-57.
19
Id. at 3, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3557.
20
See H.R. REP. NO. 99-647, 1, 22 (1986).
21
See S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 5, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3560.
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background and history surrounding the ECPA, and provides an
explanation of the relevant parts of the Act.
An individual’s right to privacy is protected by the Fourth
Amendment and federal statutes.22 In 1986, the Fourth Amendment
offered weak protection to electronic communications and few
courts had yet applied the Fourth Amendment to digital
technologies.23 Although the Fourth Amendment protects “persons,
houses, papers, and effects”24 in the real world, these protections
do not readily transfer to Americans’ “virtual homes”25 for three
important reasons.26 First, the third-party doctrine formulated by
the U.S. Supreme Court holds that Fourth Amendment protections
22

“The Framers addressed the subject of personal privacy directly in the
Fourth Amendment.” Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 400 (1976). Statutes
that provide privacy protections include the Electronic Communications Privacy
Act and the Privacy Act of 1974. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510 et seq. 5 U.S.C. § 552a.
(2010). Ten state constitutions protect citizens’ right to privacy including:
Alaska, Arizona, California, Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Louisiana, Montana,
South Carolina, and Washington. National Conference of State Legislatures,
Privacy Protections in State Constitutions, http://www.ncsl.org/research/
telecommunications-and-information-technology/privacy-protections-in-stateconstitutions.aspx (last visited March 21, 2016). See e.g., ALASKA CONST. art. I
§ 22 “The right of the people to privacy is recognized and shall not be
infringed.” See ARIZ. CONST. art. II § 8, “No person shall be disturbed in his
private affairs, or his home invaded, without authority of law.” See LA. CONST.
art. I § 5 “Every person shall be secure in his person, property, communications,
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches, seizures, or invasions
of privacy.”
23
See Orin S. Kerr, A User’s Guide to the Stored Communications Act, and a
Legislator’s Guide to Amending It, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1208, 1210 (2004).
24
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
25
The “virtual home” is a term used to describe the private information that
individuals store with network service providers that offer remote storage
capabilities and those that transmit information across the internet from one use
to another. In the virtual home individuals store private information including
bank records, personal and business calendars, steps walked, calories consumed,
as well as family photos.
26
See Kerr supra, note 23 at 1210–12, see also S. REP. NO. 99-541, 1, 1-4,
reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3555–58 (characterizing the statutory and
constitutional protections given to electronic information as “weak, ambiguous,
or non-existent” and noting that “electronic mail remains legally as well as
technically vulnerable to unauthorized surveillance”).
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are extinguished when private information is shared with a third
party.27 This doctrine limits Fourth Amendment protections for
electronic communications because users transmit and store
electronic communications through the use of ISPs.28 The thirdparty doctrine holds that when users reveal their private
information to ISPs, even if such information is only intended for
transmission or secure storage, the user forfeits any Fourth
Amendment protection of that information.29
Second, the Fourth Amendment regulates government actors,
and individuals acting as agents of the government, but not private
actors.30 ISPs are private actors, 31 and thus can search and seize

27

See e.g., Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 439–40 (1963), (ruling that
an individual had no reasonable expectation of privacy that the Fourth
Amendment protects in a recorded conversation with a government agent posing
as a friend); Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 302 (1966) (finding no
reasonable expectation of privacy in the wrongdoings revealed to a friend);
United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 752–53 (1971) (plurality opinion)
(refusing to extend Fourth Amendment protections to information recorded and
transmitted to the police by a wrongdoer’s “trusted accomplice”); United States
v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 441–43 (1976) (applying the third party doctrine to
financial records disclosed to banks even when the information was disclosed
for a limited purpose with the expectation that the bank would not share it with
others); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744–45 (1979) (determining that
Smith held no reasonable expectation of privacy in the phone numbers that he
dialed when he conveyed those numbers to the telephone company); Cf. Riley v.
California, 573 U.S. ___, ___ (2014) (slip opinion at 28) (protecting cell phone
data under the Fourth Amendment even when the information was shared with
third party cell phone carrier).
28
See S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 3 reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3557; see
also, Kerr, supra note 23, at 1210.
29
See Guest v. Leis, 255 F.3d 325, 335-36 (6th Cir. 2001) (finding no Fourth
Amendment protections in non-content information disclosed to ISPs). See also
Kerr, supra note 23, at 1210.
30
United States v. Ford, 765 F.2d 1088, 1090 (11th Cir.1985) (holding that a
search by a private person does not implicate the Fourth Amendment unless the
individual acts as an instrument or agent of the government.); see also CORNELL
UNIV. L. SCH., Fourth Amendment: An Overview, available at:
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/fourth_amendment (last visited March 21,
2016) (describing the Fourth Amendment as regulating unreasonable
governmental intrusion but not private intrusion).
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their users’ information, even if the information is protected by the
Fourth Amendment, and reveal information to the government
without implicating the Fourth Amendment. The Fourth
Amendment gives “no protection to the wrongdoer whose trusted
accomplice [or ISP] is or becomes a police agent.”32
Third, the Fourth Amendment empowers the government to
use a grand jury subpoena to induce private parties to release
Fourth Amendment protected information.33 When retrieving
electronic communications, the government does not personally
search or seize the electronic files; instead, the Government uses a
grand jury subpoena to force the ISP to release information
relevant to the investigation.34 The government can obtain a grand
jury subpoena based on reasonableness, a standard less stringent
than probable cause.35 In this way, the Fourth Amendment allows
the government to obtain a user’s electronic communication
without a warrant or probable cause. However, a private actor
compelled to disclose information by a grand jury subpoena is
protected by the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness requirement
and can challenge the subpoena in court as unreasonable.36
31

Examples of ISPs include UUNET, Qwest, Sprint, AT&T, and GTE. All of
these companies are private businesses that offer services for a fee and are
unaffiliated with the U.S. federal government. See Internet Service Provider
(ISP)
GALE
ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF
E-COMMERCE
(2002),
http://www.encyclopedia.com/topic/Internet_service_provider.aspx (last visited
March 21, 2016).
32
United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 752 (1971).
33
In re Subpoena Duces Tecum, 228 F.3d 341, 347–49 (4th Cir. 2000)
(implementing Fourth Amendment protections when the government used a
subpoena that mandated disclosure of private papers by requiring the
government to show reasonableness in the scope, relevancy, and burden of the
subpoena). See also American Civil Liberties Union v. Clapper, 785 F.3d 787,
814–15 (2d Cir. 2015).
34
SEC uses a subpoena to compel others to provide documents and testimony.
U.S.
SEC.
&
EXCH.
COMM’N,
How
Investigations
Work,
https://www.sec.gov/News/Article/Detail/Article/1356125787012.
35
In re Subpoena Duces Tecum, 228 F.3d at 347 (differentiating the basis
needed for a warrant, which is probable cause under the Fourth Amendment, and
a subpoena, which is reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment).
36
Id; see also Hale v Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 76 (1906) (applying Fourth
Amendment protections against unreasonable subpoenas to corporations).
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Collectively, these Fourth Amendment principles have left
electronic communications held by third parties out in the open for
the government to find.
Three key federal statutes, collectively referred to as the
ECPA, protect individuals’ privacy on the Internet,37 the ECPA is
comprised of the Wiretap Act,38 the Stored Communications Act
(“SCA”),39 and the Pen Register Act,40 which protect individuals’
oral and written wire and electronic communications from third
party interference and regulate government surveillance of those
data while in transmission and storage.41 Congress now moves to
amend portions of the ECPA, specifically SCA, to recalibrate the
balance struck between privacy interests and law enforcement
interests tangled up in the SCA. Thus, a brief explanation of the
current Act is necessary.42 In this section, Part A will discuss the
technological assumptions upon which the SCA is based and the
types of ISPs covered under the SCA. Part B of this section
examines the privacy protections afforded to different types of
37

See Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (1986). The ECPA is codified in
various portions of chapter 18 of the United States Code, 18 U.S.C. § 1367,
§§ 2510-22, §§ 2701-12, §§ 3121–27.
38
18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–22 (2010). The Wiretap Act prohibits the interception of
any wire, oral, or electronic communication while the communication is in
transit.
39
Id. at §§ 2701–12. The Stored Communications Act regulates access to
stored electronic communications. The Act is discussed in further detail in Part
II A and B, infra.
40
Id. at §§ 1367, 3121–27. The Pen Register Act limits the installation and
use of pen registers and trap and trace devices which collect transactions
information about the communication as defined in Id. § 3127(3)(4). The Pen
Register Act is not a part of Congress’s ECPA Amendment Bills and thus is
beyond the scope of this Recent Development. For more information on this
statute, see ORIN S. KERR, COMPUTER CRIME LAW, 618–32 (3d ed. 2012).
41
Together the Wiretap Act and the Stored Communications Act provide
these protections, specifically, 18 U.S.C. § 2511 prohibits the interception of
wire, oral, or electronic communications during transmission, and Id. § 2701
prohibits unauthorized access to a facility that provides electronic
communications services or stores electronic communications.
42
Two bills amending the Stored Communications Act, one portion of the
ECPA, circulated through committees in the House and Senate in 2015 and early
2016. The bills are identical in language.

N.C. J.L. & TECH. ON. 185, 193
Electronic Communications Privacy Act
	
  

communications and the burdens that the government must meet in
order to compel information from ISPs.
A. Structure of the Stored Communications Act
The SCA, one part of the ECPA, protects the privacy of
electronic communications by providing customers and subscribers
with statutory rights and remedies that limit access to
information.43 Specifically, the SCA regulates retrospective
surveillance44 (surveillance of stored communications)45 of emails
and messages held by specific types of ISPs.46 The SCA protects
the privacy of electronic communications through § 2703, which
prescribes different thresholds of proof that the government must
meet to compel a provider to disclose various types of
43

The SCA prohibits unauthorized access of a “facility through which an
electronic communication service is provided . . . ; and thereby obtains, alters, or
prevents authorized access to a wire or electronic communication while it is in
electronic storage.” Id. § 2701. Violators face fines and imprisonment up to ten
years. Id.
44
The following example from Kerr, differentiates retrospective surveillance
from prospective surveillance:
Wiretapping a telephone provides the classic example of prospective
surveillance. When the FBI wiretaps a telephone line, it seeks to listen to the
contents of future conversations. In the case of retrospective surveillance, in
contrast, the government seeks to access stored records of past communications.
The use of O.J. Simpson’s telephone records in his murder trial furnishes a wellknown example. The Los Angeles Police Department obtained Simpson’s phone
records to show that Simpson had made several suspicious calls the night of his
wife’s murder. This example illustrates retrospective surveillance . . . ; the police
used the phone company’s stored business records relating to past
communications to try to prove Simpson’s guilt. (emphasis added).
Orin S. Kerr, Internet Surveillance Law After the USA Patriot Act: The Big
Brother That Isn’t, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 606, 616 (2003).
45
See 18 U.S.C. § 2701 (2010); see also Deirdre K. Mulligan, Reasonable
Expectations in Electronic Communications: A Critical Perspective on the
Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1557, 1565
(2004) (describing the form of surveillance governed by the SCA).
46
See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510(15), 2711(2) (2010) (defining the two types of
Internet service providers covered under the SCA: providers of electronic
communication services, and providers of remote computer storage). The
covered ISPs are described in more detail later in this section.
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communications.47 Section 2702 defines when an ISP can
voluntarily disclose communications to the Government.48 Finally,
the SCA imposes harsh penalties and imprisonment for up to ten
years upon any person who violates the statute.49
Congress formulated privacy protections in the SCA based on
specific assumptions regarding the way that computer-to-computer
communications worked in the 1980s.50 These concepts influenced
the scope of the SCA with regard to which types of ISPs were
covered and which types of communications were shielded most
faithfully from government surveillance. The first assumption that
informed the SCA was the way in which service providers
transmitted communications and processed data.51 At that time,
business and individuals used computers for information
processing and storage.52 In the process of sending and receiving
electronic data, such as emails, providers of electronic
communication services developed a system that created and
stored copies of the information at least until the intended recipient
downloaded the content.53 Although storage sometimes lasted for
as long as three months.54 This system of copying and storing
electronic information warded against system failures that would
otherwise wipe out electronic data.55
In processing, data businesses sent company records to
providers of remote computer services for advanced analysis, and
service providers retained copies of these customer files for long

47

See id. § 2703.
See id. § 2702.
49
See id. § 2701(b).
50
See H.R. REP. NO. 99-647, 1, 22–23 (1986) (describing data transmissions,
electronic mail, and remote computing services as the technologies were
understood in 1986 when the ECPA passed).
51
See S. REP. NO. 99-541, 1, 3 reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3557.
52
See id.
53
See id., H.R. REP. NO. 99-647, 1, 22 (1986).
54
See S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 3 reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3557, see
also H.R. REP. NO. 99-647, at 22.
55
See S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 3 reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3557, see
also H.R. REP. NO. 99-647, at 22.
48
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periods of time.56 For example, before Microsoft Excel, Lotus 123,
and similar computer programs, businesses (or individuals with
need) hired remote computing services to perform advanced
analytics on data to determine things such as customer trends or
projected gross earnings.57 The next assumption applied to
providers of remote computer services that stored bulk amounts of
data for individuals and businesses. In the 1980s, users sought out
electronic storage providers and paid for remote electronic storage
space where business records and other files would live.58
Operating under these assumptions, Congress constructed the
SCA to protect electronic communications held by two types of
public ISPs: providers of electronic communications service
(“ECS”) and providers of remote computing service (“RCS”).59
Under the SCA, a provider of ECS is one that enables users to send
and receive wire or electronic communications,60 while a provider
of RCS is one that offers long-term electronic storage or
computerized information processing to the public.61 A provider’s
status as an ECS or a RCS depends on the provider’s function in
connection with the specific copy of a particular communication.62
This means that one provider may serve as both an ECS and a RCS
for one communication. For example, Google and Yahoo act as an
ECS when providing email services during which communications
are transmitted and held for only short periods in short term
storage.63 These companies also perform as a RCS when providing
customers with long-term storage through applications such as

56

See S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 3 reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3557.
See id.
58
See id.
59
See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510(15)–2711(2). An “electronic communication
service” is defined as a “service which provides to users thereof the ability to
send or receive wire or electronic communications.” Id. at § 2510(15). A
“remote computing service” is defined as a provider that offers to the public
“computer storage or processing services.” Id. at § 2711(2).
60
Id. at § 2510(15).
61
Id. at § 2711(2).
62
See Kerr, supra note 23, at 1216.
63
See S. REP. NO. 99-541, 1, 14 reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3568.
57
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Google Drive64 and Dropbox.65 In addition, platforms like
Salesforce.com that produce statistics from customer information
uploaded to the site are RCSs,66 and Microsoft acts as a RCS
through its One Drive application, which offers storage of
electronic files.67
All other types of ISPs, most commonly those that do not
provide services to the public, fall beyond the scope of the SCA
and instead rely on the privacy protections embedded in the Fourth
Amendment.68 Unprotected ISPs are the most common because
they include government email accounts to which individuals may
direct inquiries, corporate email accounts from which colleagues
brainstorm business ideas and to which individuals submit job
applications, and university email accounts through which students
and professors generally communicate.
The key to determining when a provider acts as an ECS, a
RCS, or neither is to consider whether the copy in question is
“incident to transmission,”69 a backup copy of a communication
incident to transmission, or a copy in remote storage.70 For
example, when users send information from a Gmail account,
Google acts as a provider of ECS during transmission.71 Google
continues to act as a provider of ECS while the email is unopened.
64

See GOOGLE, Google Drive, https://www.google.com/drive/ (last visited
March 21, 2016).
65
See Wired Media, Rather than recreate Google Drive, Yahoo integrates
Dropbox into Mail, ARS TECHNICA, (Apr. 12, 2013, 7:15 PM),
http://arstechnica.com/information-technology/2013/04/rather-than-recreategoogle-drive-yahoo-integrates-dropbox-into-mail/.
66
See SALESFORCE, Products, https://www.salesforce.com/ (last visited March
21, 2016).
67
See MICROSOFT, OneDrive, https://onedrive.live.com/about/en-us/ (last
visited March 21, 2016).
68
See Andersen Consulting LLP v. UOP, 991 F. Supp. 1041, 1042–43 (N.D.
Ill. 1998); see also Kerr, supra note 23, at 1226.
69
18 U.S.C. § 2510(7) (showing that electronic storage is synonymous with
incident to transmission); see H.R. NO. 99-647, at 38 (defining incident to
transmission as “any temporary intermediate storage of a communication” and
any backup copy).
70
18 U.S.C. § 2510(7); H.R. NO. 99-647, at 38.
71
This example is adapted from Kerr, supra note 23, at 1216.
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The SCA categorizes unopened emails as data incident to
transmission.72 After opening emails,73 recipients may delete the
messages or leave them in their inboxes. With regards to the
opened emails in the inbox, Google becomes a provider of RCS
because Google transmitted the email to its final destination, the
recipient’s eyes, and is now holding the message for long-term
storage.74 When users take screenshots of emails or download
emails to their personal computer hard drives, Google no longer
acts as an ECS or a RCS with regard to the copy of the email on its
users’ personal computers.
However, a circuit split has developed concerning whether an
opened email is incident to transmission and thus connected to a
provider of ECS, or in remote storage, and thus connected to a
provider of RCS. The Ninth Circuit holds that an ISP acts as an
ECS to the email until the ISP and the user no longer need the
email.75 The Ninth Circuit finds the opened/unopened distinction
irrelevant because the opened email can be a backup copy of the
message that is “incident to transmission.”76 As a result, the Ninth
Circuit classifies Google as a provider of ECS for a longer period
of time, with the duration lasting for as long as the ISP or user
reasonably believes that they may need to access the file in the
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H.R. NO. 99-647, at 64–65 (classifying an opened email stored on a server
as long-term storage provided by a RCS); see Kerr, supra note 23, at 1216.
73
A circuit split has emerged with regards to whether or not an opened email
is protected under the ECPA, which is discussed below. See Theofel v. FareyJones, 359 F.3d 1066, 1076 (9th Cir. 2004) (classifying opened emails as data in
short-term storage and protected by the highest standards under the SCA); see
KLA-Tencor Corp. v. Murphy, 717 F. Supp. 2d 895, 904 (N.D. Cal. 2010)
(applying Theofel); c.f. United States v. Weaver, 636 F. Supp. 2d 769, 772 (C.D.
Ill. 2009) (finding Theofel “unpersuasive”); c.f. United States v. Warshak, 631
F.3d 266, 291 (6th Cir. 2010) (calling the Ninth Circuit’s classification in
Theofel “implausible”).
74
H.R. NO. 99-647, at 64–65 (delineating long-term storage as any storage
that goes beyond the email’s delivery).
75
Theofel, 359 F.3d at 1076.
76
See id. at 1077 (determining that opening an email does not change the
character of the communication or the relationship between the ISP and the
communication).
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future.77 These classifications are critical because they determine
the privacy protections available for the communication.
B. Privacy Protections that Limit Government Access under the
Stored Communications Act
The SCA provides Fourth Amendment-like protections to
electronic communications through § 2703, which governs how
and when the government can compel an ISP to divulge electronic
communications.78 The designation as a provider of ECS or RCS
plays a crucial role in the implementation of § 2703 because the
government can compel information in different ways and times
depending on whether the communication is held by a provider of
ECS or RCS.79
Specifically, § 2703 imposes distinct standards that the
government must meet to compel ISPs to disclose different types
of communications.80 The highest protections go to the providers of
ECSs.81 The Government must obtain a search warrant, based on
probable cause, to compel a provider of ECS to release the
contents of communications held for 180 days or less.82 However,
for information held by a provider of ECS for more than 180 days
or for information retained by a provider of RCS, the Government
may compel the provider to disclose the communications three
different ways: search warrant based on probable cause,83 a
77

See id. at 1076 (extending the duration of “incident to transmission” for as
long as ISP or user may need to download the communication from the ISP’s
server).
78
18 U.S.C. § 2703.
79
See id. § 2703(a)–(b).
80
See id. The rules in § 2703 govern content and non-content information.
Content information “includes any information concerning the substance,
purport, or meaning of that communication,” while non-content information
includes data such as transactional record and account logs. 18 U.S.C.
§ 2510(8); see also U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Searching and Seizing Computers
Obtaining Electronic Evidence in Criminal Investigations, 130 (2009),
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminal-ccips/legacy/2015/01/14/
ssmanual2009.pdf.
81
See 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a).
82
See id. at § 2703(a).
83
See id. at § 2703(b)(1)(B).

N.C. J.L. & TECH. ON. 185, 199
Electronic Communications Privacy Act
	
  

subpoena with notice to the ECS’s customer,84 or a court order with
notice to the customer of the provider of ECS.85 To obtain a list of
basic subscriber information, the government needs only a
subpoena (without notice to the subscriber) to compel the ISP to
provide the subscriber’s name, address, local and long distance
telephone connection records, or records of session times and
durations, length of service and types of services utilized,
telephone or instrument number or other subscriber number or
identity, including any temporarily assigned network address, and
means and source of payment for such service including any credit
card or bank account number.86
An example can help to explain these rules. Suppose for
example, that law enforcement approaches Google with a warrant
based on probable cause. With this authority, the government can
obtain anything specifically identified in the warrant that Google
holds, including opened or unopened emails, no matter what type
of provider holds the data and no matter how long the data have
been stored. If the government approaches Google with a subpoena
with notice to the customer, the government can compel Google to
disclose basic subscriber information, from a provider of RCS the
government can compel opened emails and other stored data, from
a provider of ECS the government can compel emails in storage
for more than 180 days. If the government approaches Google with
a subpoena without notice to the customer, the government can
only compel basic subscriber information, which includes the
subscriber’s name, IP address, and the source of payment for
services. This example illustrates the ways that the government can
compel the same types of information through various methods,
while also demonstrating the limitations of the subpoena with
notice compared to the wide reach of a warrant.
To obtain a warrant, the government must show probable cause
for its belief that evidence of a crime is present in the place to be

84

See id. at § 2703(b)(1)(B)(i).
See id. at § 2703(b)(1)(B)(ii).
86
See id. at § 2703(c)(2).
85
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searched.87 A subpoena may be obtained in a civil or criminal
investigation; the notable difference between the two appears when
a court becomes involved.88 During criminal investigations, the
government may obtain a court-issued subpoena by showing that
the request is not “unreasonable or oppressive.”89 To meet these
standards, courts have required the government to show that the
subpoenaed information is evidentiary and relevant, that the
evidence cannot reasonably be obtained in other ways, and that the
government requested the subpoena in good faith, rather than as a
fishing expedition.90 During civil investigations, subpoenas are
issued without any action by the court.91 An agency or attorney92
issuing a subpoena must still show that the subpoenaed
information is relevant to a claim or defense in the case.93 With the
power of a warrant or subpoena, the government can compel
information from an ISP, even when the ISP is not involved in the
litigation.94 However, Congress has limited the many powers that
87

Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 214 (1983) (examining when a confidential
informant’s tip meets the standard of probable cause for the issuance of a
warrant); CORNELL UNIV. L. SCH., Probable Cause, https://www.law.cornell.edu/
wex/probable_cause#footnoteref1_q2zy1wf (last visited March 21, 2016).
88
See FED. R. CIV. P. 45(a)(3) (authorizing licensed attorneys to issue and
sign civil subpoenas without involving the court); cf. FED. R. CIV. P. 45(a)(3)
(requiring the court to authorize and approve a subpoena during a criminal
investigation).
89
FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(c)(1).
90
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 700 (1974).
91
See FED. R. CIV. P. 45(a)(3) (assigning the clerk of the court and attorneys
authorized to practice in the district with the power to issue and sign civil
subpoenas); see also CAB v. Hermann, 353 U.S. 322, 323 (1957) (giving
government agencies the absolute right to issue administrative subpoenas).
92
FED. R. CIV. P. 45(a)(3), “Subdivision (a)(3) specifies that an attorney
authorized to practice in that court may issue a subpoena, which is consistent
with current practice.”; FED. R. CIV. P. 45, Notes of Advisory Committee on
Rules—2013 Amendment; see also § 2453 Form and Issuance of a Subpoena,
9A FED. PRAC. & PROC. CIV. § 2453 (3d ed.).
93
FED. R. CIV. P. 45(3); see S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 39; see also, § 2459
Subpoena for the Production of Documents and Things—Quashing or
Modifying a Subpoena, 9A FED. PRAC. & PROC. CIV. § 2459 (3d ed.)
94
See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 45 (compelling testimony, documents, and
tangible items from third parties unaffiliated with the litigation).
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would enable agencies and attorneys to enforce their own
subpoenas.95 Thus, failure to comply with a subpoena can only be
corrected by a court order.96 In addition to the burden of proof that
the government must meet under § 2703, the SCA provides
individuals with the opportunity to quash the subpoena by showing
that the subpoena is unreasonable in time, scope, or burden.97 The
burden of showing unreasonableness falls on the individual
moving to quash.98
III. EMAIL PRIVACY ACT AND THE SEC’S PROPOSED CIVIL
EXEMPTION
The Email Privacy Act, a bill in the House with bipartisan
support,99 aims to recalibrate the ECPA in light of the highly
advanced technologies of today, which are vastly different from
those available when the ECPA was first passed in 1986.100 The
Email Privacy Act aims to clarify the law in § 2703101 that governs
95

See United States v. Bisceglia, 420 U.S. 141, 151 (1975) (protecting
individuals from arbitrary government subpoena power by placing the court
between the government and the individual subpoenaed).
96
See United States v. Vivian, 217 F.2d 882, 883 (7th Cir. 1955) (requiring a
separate court hearing before holding a subpoenaed individual in contempt for
noncompliance).
97
18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) (2010); see also S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 39.
98
See id. at § 2459 Subpoena for the Production of Documents and Things—
Quashing or Modifying a Subpoena, 9A Fed. Prac. & P. Civ. § 2459 (3d ed.)
99
See Sophia Cope, Senate Judiciary Committee Finally Focuses on ECPA
Reform, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Sept. 14, 2015), https://www.eff.org/
deeplinks/2015/09/senate-judiciary-committee-finally-focuses-ecpa-reform
(declaring the President’s support for ECPA reforms); see also BIG DATA:
SEIZING OPPORTUNITIES, PRESERVING VALUES, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT (May 1, 2014) https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/
docs/big_data_privacy_report_may_1_2014.pdf (last visited Jan. 17, 2016).
100
The World Wide Web did not exist at the time that the ECPA was passed.
The World Wide Web further blurs the distinction between providers of ECS
and RCS because today many websites process information sent to them which
could qualify them as a RCS, however, legislative history indicates that a data
processing service included under the RCS label covered outsourced data
processing. See S. REP. No. 99-541, 1, 3, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555,
3557; see also Committee Announces Hearing, supra note 7.
101
18 U.S.C. § 2703.
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when and how the Government may compel ISPs to disclose a
subscriber’s private communications and data.102 In reaction to the
Email Privacy Act, the SEC has pushed back arguing that the
legislation will hinder the Commission’s enforcement efforts.103
This section focuses on the ECPA amendment, subsection A
discusses the assumptions that inform the E-Privacy Act and the
heightened protections that Congress proposes for various types of
electronic communications. Subsection B goes through the SEC’s
proposed civil exemption and demonstrates how the agency’s
proposed exemption rests on the old assumptions of the 1986
ECPA.
A. ECPA Reform: The E-Privacy Act
Many things have changed since the ECPA passed in 1986, but
two critical changes specifically underlie the need for ECPA
reform: technological advances and the changing judicial
interpretation of the ECPA.104 Today, agencies are uncertain of
what simple words mean in the ECPA and are unclear on what the
statute empowers agencies to do.105 The Email Privacy Act
provides clarity regarding the protections given to various types of
electronic communications, and attunes the balance between
privacy interests and law enforcement needs in this new
technological era.106
102

See Committee Announces Hearing, supra note 7.
See Andrew Ceresney, Testimony on Updating the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N (Sept. 16, 2015),
https://www.sec.gov/news/testimony/testimony-electronic-communicationsprivacy-act.html.
104
See Committee Announces Hearing, supra note 7; see also Warshak v. United
States, 631 F.3d at 266; see also Theofel v. Farey-Jones, 359 F.3d 1066.
105
See Letter from Mary Jo White, Chair, SEC, to Sen. Patrick Leahy, Chair,
Sen. Judiciary Comm. (Apr. 24, 2013), at 3, https://www.cdt.org/files/
file/SEC%20ECPA%20Letter.pdf [hereinafter Mary Jo White Letter]
(describing how the SEC has not used its § 2703(b) subpoena power since the
Sixth Circuit decided Warshak, and suggesting that the Commission is
concerned or confused over its ability to use a power that the ECPA granted to
it).
106
DIGITAL
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ECPA
Reform:
Why
Now?,
www.digitaldueprocess.org/index.cfm?objectid=37940370-2551-11DF103
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The enumerated goals of the Email Privacy Act include (1)
providing consistency so that electronic communications and data
are protected in the same way without regard to the technology
used to communicate or store these data; (2) protecting privacy
while preserving methods of civil and criminal investigation; and
(3) providing clarity to the government, the public, and service
providers regarding their obligations and rights during government
investigations.107 For example, the opened/unopened distinction
that exists everywhere but the Ninth Circuit108 complicates issues
when the government approaches an ISP with a subpoena with
notice to the subscriber.109 Under judicial interpretation, this form
of process would be sufficient in a North Carolina federal court,110
but may not be in a California federal court.111
Specifically, the ECPA reform bills provide consistency112 by
protecting an individual’s virtual home in the same way that the
law protects an individual’s real home. The amendments would
create a single standard—a warrant113—for retrieving the contents
8e02000C296BA163 (last visited Jan. 17, 2016); see also Committee Announces
Hearing, supra note 7.
107
H.R. 699, 114th Cong. (2015); see Chairman Bob Goodlatte, Statement of
Judiciary Committee Chairman Bob Goodlatte Full Committee Hearing on H.R.
699, The Email Privacy Act, JUD. CMTE. U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
http://judiciary.house.gov/index.cfm/press-releases?id=AD96D145-2264-495B87A4-BA7506EF3B66 (last visited Jan. 17, 2016).
108
See Part II B. infra.
109
See infra, note 73.
110
28 U.S.C. §§ 41, 81–131 (2010) (classifying North Carolina to be included
in the Fourth Circuit of the Federal District Courts).
111
Id. (classifying California to be included in the Ninth Circuit of the Federal
District Courts); see also Theofel, 359 F. 3d at 1077 (changing the traditional
understanding of the process required to compel an ISP to disclose an opened
email).
112
Furthermore, these reform amendments provide a standard that
consistently applies across all investigative agencies, including federal, state,
and local agencies. H.R. 699; H.R. 283, 114th Cong. (2015-2016).
113
Under the ECPA Amendments, a court-approved search warrant is
required for any investigation into the content of electronic communications and
records. However, a subpoena satisfies civil investigations when the agency
wishes to collect only the “name, address, local and long distance telephone
connection records, or records of session times and durations, length of service
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of electronic communications, no matter how old the records are,
whether the emails have been opened, or where the records are
stored.114 A consistent warrant requirement across files of all ages
would account for new technology, including massive cloud
computing and archived files. The cloud offers virtually unlimited
data storage, which prompts users to retain emails and files for a
longer period of time. As a result of this file hoarding, a much
larger number of files fall outside of warrant protection under the
1986 version of the ECPA.115 The proposed updates to the ECPA
take into account the need and ability to store electronic
information for longer periods, as they provide the same protection
to older emails and files of all ages.116 In the cloud, individuals
intentionally store a large amount of information.117 However,
because ISPs frequently archive information, these data can get
stored in the cloud without an individual’s knowledge or intent,
and thus people could potentially be exposed to warrantless
(including start date) and types of service used, telephone or instrument number
or other subscriber number or identity, including any temporarily assigned
network address, and means and source of payment for such service of a
subscriber or customer of such service.” H.R. 699 §3 (c), 114th Cong. (2015).
114
“A governmental entity may require the disclosure by a provider of
electronic communication service or remote computing service of the contents
of a wire or electronic communication that is in electronic storage with or
otherwise stored, held, or maintained by the provider only if the governmental
entity obtains a warrant . . . .” H.R. 699 (a). In contrast to the current law, “a
governmental entity may require the disclosure by a provider of electronic
communication service of the contents of a wire or electronic communication,
that is in electronic storage in an electronic communications system for one
hundred and eighty days or less, only pursuant to a warrant . . . . A governmental
entity may require the disclosure by a provider of electronic communications
services of the content of a wire or electronic communication that has been in
electronic storage in an electronic communications system for more than one
hundred and eighty days” with an administrative subpoena. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(a)(b).
115
See 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (exempting information stored with providers of
RCS from the warrant requirement).
116
H.R. 699, 114th Cong. (2015).
117
See Sebastian Anthony, How big is the cloud? EXTREME TECH (May 23,
2012, 10:48 am) http://www.extremetech.com/computing/129183-how-big-isthe-cloud.
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searches through no fault of their own. When information is
archived, individuals have no control over what is stored and what
is deleted.118 The ECPA amendments consider how electronic
information storage has evolved over time and provide Americans
with protections that match this millennium’s ever-growing
technologies.
The amendments maintain the ECPA’s goal of balancing law
enforcement needs with Americans’ right to be free from
government intrusion in their inboxes. Although the ECPA reform
amendments prohibit enforcement agencies from accessing the
content of electronic files without a warrant, these entities will still
have the power to use subpoenas to access and collect transactional
information needed for civil investigations, such as names,
addresses, time stamps, services provided, and payment
information.119 Legislators provided a carve-out that made a courtissued subpoena120 the standard for the government to access
internal corporate emails between officers, agents, and
employees.121 Congress also kept warrant exceptions for
emergencies involving danger of death or serious physical
injury.122 In most circumstances, the government must notify
customers of its investigations with service of process and inform
customers when any of their information was accessed or obtained
during a subpoena-powered investigation.123 To balance the needs
of law enforcement, the government may, upon approval of the
court, delay notification for no more than 180 days.124 This strikes
an appropriate balance because it requires a neutral magistrate to
determine if delay of notification is appropriate. Furthermore, the
118

HOW TO GEEK, How to Recover or Permanently Delete Files from the
Cloud,
http://www.howtogeek.com/212601/how-to-recover-or-permanentlydelete-files-from-the-cloud/ (last visited March 21, 2016).
119
H.R. 699; H.R. 283, 114th Cong. (2015).
120
This is still stronger than the 1986 version of the ECPA, which allowed a
member or appointee of the SEC to issue a subpoena, whereas the Amendment
requires a court to do so. See 18 U.S.C. § 2703; see also H.R. 699.
121
H.R. 699, 114th Cong. (2015).
122
18 U.S.C. § 2258A (2010); 18 U.S.C § 2702(b) (2010).
123
See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
124
H.R. 699 § 4(a)(1)–(4).
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delay is limited to instances when there is reason to believe that
notification would endanger the investigation of life or limb.125
Reform also provides clarity and protection to service
providers. The amendments define the exact information that a
service provider must disclose when an investigating agency serves
a subpoena126 and makes it illegal for a provider of n ECS or RCS
to disclose the contents of any records under its control unless the
investigating governmental agency presents a warrant.127 These
clear-cut and definitive rules give customers confidence in the
privacy and security of their electronic information. Today, the
cost of physical storage facilities is expensive and organizing paper
files is cumbersome and time-consuming. The cloud offers a
cheaper alternative and provides search and find features to locate
needed files quickly. The clear-cut rules of the ECPA amendments
will provide peace-of-mind and allow businesses to select the most
cost-efficient and productive form of mass storage—the cloud.
Furthermore, these amendments protect the longevity of the
American technology sector by dissipating customers’ fears that
their information may be susceptible to a warrantless government
search.
The progress that Congress has made in creating the E-mail
Privacy Act is threatened by the SEC’s proposed civil exemptions.
As you will read in the next subsection, the SEC’s proposed
exemption relies on old assumptions regarding the way that
technology works and the way that individuals and businesses
interact with computer technologies.
B. Proposed SEC Exemptions to ECPA Reform
In response to the first wave of ECPA reform bills, the Chair of
the SEC proposed that the Commission be exempt from the
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See id.
See supra note 86 and accompanying text (describing the information that
is accessible under the power of a subpoena in civil investigations).
127
H.R. 699, 114th Cong. (2015); H.R. 283, 114th Cong. (2015); S. 356,
114th Cong. (2015).
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warrant requirement to obtain electronic information.128 This
exemption would grant to federal civil law enforcement agencies
the power to induce service providers to provide electronic records
and files without a warrant.129 This proposed exemption would
authorize the SEC and other federal civil agencies, including the
EPA and the IRS, to collect information from an ISP without going
directly to the individual under investigation. The SEC claims that
it needs this authority because electronic communications often
provide critical evidence establishing the “timing, knowledge,
relationships in certain cases, or awareness that certain statements
to investors were false or misleading.”130 The Commission points
out that obstinate defendants and geographical boundaries pose
issues to the agency’s investigations:
In certain instances, the person whose emails are sought will respond to
our request. But in other instances, the subpoena recipient may have
erased emails, tendered only some emails, asserted damaged hardware,
or refused to respond – unsurprisingly, individuals who violate the law
are often reluctant to produce to the government evidence of their own
misconduct. In still other instances, email account holders cannot be
subpoenaed because they are beyond our jurisdiction.131

The SEC fights against the Email Privacy Act’s warrant
requirement because the SEC, as a civil agency, cannot obtain a
criminal warrant.132 The Commission notes that its ability to seek
information directly from the ISP is critical for three reasons. First,
it provides the Commission with authority that encourages targets
to deliver information themselves.133 Targets are more likely to
comply with subpoena orders when the Commission can threaten
alternative ways to obtain the information, such as going to the ISP
to get the information.134 However, if the agency lost these
128

Mary Jo White Letter, supra note 105. The request was made again during
a September 2015 hearing before the Senate Judiciary Committee. Reforming
the Electronic Communication Privacy Act: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 114th Cong. (2015) (statement from Ceresney, supra note 103).
129
Mary Jo White Letter, supra note 105.
130
Ceresney, supra note 103.
131
Mary Jo White Letter, supra note 105.
132
Id.
133
Id.
134
Id.
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alternative routes to collect information, targets would be more
likely to destroy incriminating information and less likely to
comply with subpoenas because they would understand that if the
SEC is unable to get the information from them, it will be unable
to collect the information from anyone else.
Second, the Commission argues that the power to seek
information from ISPs is critical in times when the targeted
subscriber has deleted emails, damaged hardware, or fled to a
jurisdiction where a subpoena has no authority.135 ISPs maintain
extensive backup copies of files; thus by going to the ISP to
compel information, the SEC will have a full and complete record
from which to draw evidence.136 An ISP’s backup system is critical
to this argument because it provides the Commission with the most
thorough, and complete information. After compelling information
from the ISP, the SEC knows that it has evidence that is
untampered with and void of any gaps. Without the power to
compel information from the ISP some information like deleted
emails or corrupted files will be inaccessible. Thus, the SEC may
be left with an incomplete record to fuel its investigation and
prosecution.
Third, the SEC argues that the Commission’s power to compel
ISPs to disclose information prevents the cat and mouse chase.137
This could happen if the Commission reissues subpoenas for the
jurisdiction to which the target fled.138 This chase would waste the
SEC’s time and money and lead to ineffective and inefficient
securities law enforcement.
Instead of a warrant, the SEC proposes legislation “that would
(1) require civil law enforcement agencies to attempt, where
possible, to seek electronic communications directly from a
subscriber before seeking them from an ISP; and (2) should
seeking them from an ISP be necessary, give the subscriber or
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Id.
Id.
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Mary Jo White Letter, supra note 105; Ceresney, supra note 103.
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Mary Jo White Letter, supra note 105; Ceresney, supra note 103.
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customer the opportunity to challenge the request in a judicial
proceeding.”139
The second prong of the SEC’s proposal would purportedly
offer more protections140 than a warrant because it gives
individuals an opportunity to challenge search requests, an option
unavailable under a warrant. While the SEC’s desire to give every
person a voice is noble, it would not work out as suggested in
practice because the plaintiff, the SEC, selects the venue of the
court. Thus, the courthouse where the defendant would need to
appear in order to contest the SEC’s search request would likely be
far from home, making it difficult or impossible to afford the
trip.141 Furthermore, the SEC’s proposal overlooks the fact that an
overwhelming majority of searches are conducted without warrants
and are based upon the consent of the targeted individual.142 One
study suggested that as many as 98% of warrantless searches are
conducted by consent.143 Statistics show that people often consent
to searches even when there is no real threat of a legal search; thus,
if people consent to searches after verbal requests, it is highly
unlikely that an individual facing a formal order authorizing a
search would protest the order or the Commission’s right to search.
This is especially true given the SEC’s strong enforcement
reputation,144 which enhances its authority and domination over its
investigatory targets. Looking past the natural tendency to obey
authority, the SEC’s second prong poses an even bigger issue
139

Ceresney, supra note 103.
See id.
141
FED. R. CIV. P. 1391.
142
See, e.g., RICHARD VAN DUIZEND ET AL., THE SEARCH WARRANT PROCESS
68–69 (1984).
143
Id. at 19. Quoting a police detective as follows: “Actually, there are a lot of
warrants that are not sought because of the hassle . . . . I don’t think you can
forgo a case because of the hassle of a search warrant, but you can . . . work
some other method. If I can get consent [to search], I’m gonna do it.” Id. This
detective suggested that as many as 98% of the searches were by consent. Id.
144
See Hazel Bradford, SEC Management Enforcement Unit Evolves into
Respected Watchdog, PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS (Nov. 30. 2015),
http://www.pionline.com/article/20151130/PRINT/311309984/sec-managementenforcement-unit-evolves-into-respected-watchdog.
140
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because it provides no standard of proof that the SEC must meet
before making a search request. 145 The Email Privacy Act reform is
intended to put digital and paper effects on the same playing field.
The SEC’s proposal does not accomplish this object, as it provides
no standards that the agency must follow in order to compel an ISP
to disclose an individual’s electronic communications.
The SEC’s proposal implements process to protect the privacy
rights of individuals by forcing agencies to approach the target of
the investigation first. However, it falls short in that it still allows
the agency to gather information from an ISP without a showing of
probable cause.146
IV. THE EMAIL PRIVACY ACT SHOULD PASS WITHOUT THE
SEC’S PROPOSED AGENCY EXEMPTION
The Email Privacy Act should pass without the SEC’s
proposed civil agency exemption because the amendments will not
inhibit the SEC’s enforcement power while following the court’s
preference for a Fourth Amendment bright-line rule.
A. The Commission’s Powers to Gather and Collect Evidence in
Civil Investigations
As a civil law enforcement agency, the SEC has never had the
power to obtain a warrant.147 Instead, the SEC has relied on
subpoenas to investigate alleged violations. The ECPA-reformbills change how the government may obtain the contents of
electronic communications; however, these changes would not
inhibit the SEC’s ability to investigate civil crimes due to
Congress’s carve-out for corporate emails sent among insiders and
145

See Ceresney, supra note 103 (providing no standard that the government
must satisfy before compelling ISP to disclose information).
146
See id. The SEC’s proposal requires reasonable suspicion rather than
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employees.148 Furthermore, the SEC has relied solely on subpoenas
served directly on individuals since 2010, with impressive
enforcement rates and outcomes.149 A court-issued subpoena is
adequate for the government to access internal corporate emails
sent between officers, agents, and employees, and it provides a
warrant exception for emergencies involving danger of death or
serious physical injury. Furthermore, this bill empowers the
government to delay notification to individuals whose information
has been obtained; however, the delay requires court approval and
cannot be extended beyond 180 days.
The corporate email carve-out150 would enable the SEC to
continue its civil investigations as usual. Under the corporate email
carve-out, the Email Privacy Act affords less protection to
employee emails sent from corporate accounts than to individual
emails sent from personal accounts.151 Under this exception,
agencies seeking an employee’s emails sent from a corporate email
account may get permission to search from the corporation instead
of getting consent directly from the employee.152 Here, Congress
finds the potential for shared responsibility to justify the alternative
route to consent.153 Given that the SEC primarily regulates
corporate insiders, this exclusion will allow the agency unfettered
access to corporate emails, which are typically treasure troves for
insider trading investigations.154
During civil investigations, emails and other electronic files
can be effectively obtained through the use of subpoenas issued
directly to individuals either being investigated or who have sent or
received the emails being sought.155 Any civil law enforcement
148
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agency, including the SEC, can enforce these subpoenas by having
a court demand that the user disclose the requested data.156
Furthermore, the ECPA (in its current state and under the reform
bills) provides the SEC and other civil enforcement agencies with
the power to issue preservation orders to prevent an individual
from destroying evidence while a court-approved subpoena is
sought.157 The SEC will retain these powers under the ECPA
reform amendments.
The SEC has not sought content from ISPs since 2010,158 when
the Sixth Circuit declared that the government must have a warrant
before secretly searching and seizing emails stored by a third-party
ISP.159 Even without this investigative tool, the SEC has been a
dominating force in American civil law enforcement, with 755
total enforcement actions in 2014,160 as compared to a total of 664
enforcement actions in 2009,161 the last full calendar year that the
SEC compelled information directly from ISPs162 Between 2009
and 2014, nearly every category of SEC enforcement action has
increased.163 The only category that decreased, Issuer Reporting
affect the SEC’s power to serve the individuals under investigation in order to
obtain their records.
156
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and Disclosure, involves the failure of corporations to file
information in a timely manner with the SEC.164 This category is
not affected by the agency’s ability to investigate corporations’
internal files because these filings are made directly to the SEC.165
In these investigations, the SEC will have the filing in hand, which
is all of the information needed to prosecute the violation. If the
SEC does not possess the filing, this indicates that the corporation
failed to file, but the SEC does not need to investigate corporate
files to discover this. It only need investigate its own files, which it
has plenary power to do. In spite of the SEC’s lost investigative
tool, it appears that the agency does not need a loophole around
serving the target of its investigations in order to effectively
enforce its civil laws.
B. Fourth Amendment’s Preference for Bright-Line Rules
The Supreme Court fights to make bright-line rules for police
officers who are fighting crimes,166 so too should the legislature
develop bright-line rules for investigators searching for evidence
within an individual’s virtual home.
Bright-line rules provide straightforward guidelines that law
enforcement officers and investigators can apply in a split
second.167 The Supreme Court has favored these rules based on
practical concerns that police officers and investigators need to act
quickly to fight crime.168 Specifically, in Dunaway v. New York, the
Supreme Court described a Fourth Amendment bright-line rule as
“essential to guide police officers, who have only limited time and
expertise . . . .”169 Again, in New York v. Belton, the Court rejected
164
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balancing tests for the Fourth Amendment and instead demanded
categorical rules:170
A highly sophisticated set of rules, qualified by all sorts of ifs, ands,
and buts and requiring the drawing of subtle nuances and hairline
distinctions, may be the sort of heady stuff upon which the facile minds
of lawyers and judges eagerly feed, but they may be “literally
impossible of application by the officer in the field.171

Later, in Robinson v. United States, the Court reaffirmed its
belief in a bright-line test by rejecting case-by-case analysis for
Fourth Amendment scrutiny.172 Recently, the demand for a brightline rule has been applied to electronic content in Riley v.
California.173
In Riley, the police stopped a gang member for driving with
expired registration tags.174 During the stop, police gained lawful
authority to impound Riley’s car and conducted a full and legal
vehicle search.175 Through the lawful vehicle search, the police
uncovered two illegally possessed weapons for which they arrested
Riley.176 Incident to arrest, police took Riley’s smart phone177 and
later searched the phone’s contents, which contained pictures and
videos that identified Riley as a gang member and linked him to a
previously unsolved murder.178 On review, the Supreme Court
announced a bright-line rule for cell phone searches: “[o]ur answer
to the question of what police must do before searching a cell
phone seized incident to an arrest is accordingly simple—get a
warrant.”179 The Court based its bright-line rule on the fact that
170
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Id. at ___ (slip opinion at 28). In addition, the court refused to adopt a test
that would require lower courts to determine on a case-by-case basis when
electronic records were comparable to physical records. See id. at 25.
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technology now allows an individual to carry enormous amounts
of private information in virtual form that vastly exceeds the
amount of information that one could carry in physical form.180 The
Court deemed the amount and type of information contained in a
cell phone to be worthy of the highest degree of Fourth
Amendment protections: the warrant.181
The Email Privacy Act tracks the structure and substance of the
Riley opinion and should therefore overcome challenges in the
courts. The Act provides investigators with a simple standard that
they must meet in order to compel an ISP to disclose electronic
information.182 The Act requires a warrant183 just like the Court did
in Riley.184 The bright-line rule in the Email Privacy Act stands in
sharp contrast to the 1986 ECPA,185 which mandates different
forms of process for various types of electronic information;
however, differentiating between a provider of RCS and ECS is no
simple task, as the provider status changes over time.186 During
investigations, law enforcement officers do not have the “time or
expertise” to tease out what type of process is needed for specific
types of communication.187
Under the current ECPA regime, investigators tasked with
compelling electronic data from an ISP must consider and weigh
various facts including if the information is stored, how the
information is stored, where the information is stored, when the
information is stored, and when the information was stored.188 An
investigator contemplating these questions may not have the
resources to determine if information is in storage or whether the
180
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information exists as a backup file.189 Investigators may not be able
to determine when a user stored information with the provider in
question. Investigators are faced with so many questions that they
may not act at all. These questions render the ECPA, in its current
form, in violation of the court’s bright-line rule underscoring
Fourth Amendment protection.190 While violation of a preference is
not fatal, it does violate the Congressional intent of the 1986
Congress that passed the ECPA to provide Fourth Amendment-like
protections to electronic communications.191
These bright rules are vital to the accurate execution of the law
during high-stress, time-crunched, crime-fighting, and evidencegathering situations.192 The SEC demonstrated its expectation of
confusion in the field when it instructed investigators to see the
Office of Chief Counsel for any ECPA matters.193 The SEC
understood that the technicalities of the ECPA’s compulsion rules
are too much for laypersons to understand and think through in the
spur of the moment, like an investigator may need to do. The
current state of the ECPA, with its exceptions and hard-to-find
answers, has halted certain law enforcement techniques for fear of
an unintentional violation that will irreparably harm the
Commission’s reputation.194
The Email Privacy Reform Act provides uniform, standardized
bright-line rules that provide much needed clarity for law
enforcement so that investigators can return to their jobs of
ferreting out crime, rather than attempting to ferret out legislative
intent.
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V. CONCLUSION
The Email Privacy Act provides a clear and cogent standard to
govern investigators ferreting out crime. It greatly improves upon
the 1986 ECPA by updating the technological assumptions that
underlie the law, clarifying and rewriting rules created by common
law interpretations of the ECPA’s standards to modern technology,
and providing a clear bright-line rule that law enforcement can
execute quickly and systematically.195 These improvements cannot
be fulfilled unless the Email Privacy Act passes without the SEC’s
proposed exemption.
The SEC and Congress both agree that the ECPA needs
updating in order to keep up with current technology and to clear
up conflicting common law rules.196 However, tension results when
one looks at the different ways that the SEC and Congress plan to
reform the outdated law. While Congress wants a complete
overhaul of the 1986 version, the SEC proposes an overhaul for
criminal investigations but suggests a civil exemption for its own
agency and other civil agencies, like the IRS and EPA.197 The
SEC’s proposed exemption will protect the agency’s investigatory
power while providing additional protections to individuals by way
of additional process.198 For the last ten years, the SEC has not
sought information directly from an ISP, out of deference to a
Congress that, for years, has been grappling with ECPA reform.199
In those ten years of “limited powers” the SEC’s enforcement
results have increased in the number of individuals prosecuted, and
the amount of money collected from civil violations.200 Statistics
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show that the SEC does not need to compel an ISP to protect the
dignity of securities and the securities market.201 The additional
process that the SEC proposes in its plan empowers individuals
who are targets of SEC investigations to contest the SEC’s
subpoena and the information sought.202 However, individuals must
contribute massive amounts of time and money to assert such
procedural protections in court.203 The time and money required
makes these individual procedural protections non-existent, or at
least out of reach for most individuals.
Given society’s abundant reliance on electronic technologies
for personal, and business matters, the ECPA reform has been a
long time coming and must develop a law with strong protections.
The breadth and force of these protections is paramount because
the Fourth Amendment, which protects Americans from
unreasonable search and seizure by the government, does not
protect electronic information in the same way that it protects
tangible items.204 Thus, the American people can only rely on
Congress for shelter and Congress must deliver and deliver in a
fashion that is meaningful and responsive to the demands of
current technology in both form and function. The delivery that
Congress must make is the passage of the Email Privacy Act which
protects individuals in criminal and civil investigations through a
warrant requirement.205 In the words of the Supreme Court,
“[Congress’s] answer to the question of what police must do before
searching a[n] [electronic communications] is accordingly
simple—get a warrant.”206
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